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What Fractures Political Unions? Failed Federations, Brexit and the 
Importance of Political Commitment 
 
Dora Kostakopoulou 
 
(The final version of this article will appear in the European Law Review) 
 
Introduction  
 
Almost fifteen years ago, the Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union (EU 
thereafter) highlighted the importance of ‘mutual solidarity’ among the Member States for the 
European integration project.1 It noted that ‘Europe is the continent of solidarity’.2 The Lisbon 
Treaty made this denotation of Europe real by amplifying the scope of solidarity; it was no 
longer confined to the Member States, but it was extended to peoples (Article 1 and 3(5) TEU) 
and to generations (Article 3(3) para 2 TEU).3 A Europe of comprehensive solidarity4 at the end 
of the first decade of the new millennium thus seemed to realise the promise of the Schuman 
Declaration (9 May 1950) which gave birth to European integration: ‘Europe will not be made all 
at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first 
create a de facto solidarity.’5  
 
The Brexit outcome of the referendum on the United Kingdom’s continued membership of the 
EU on the 23 of June 2016 suspended the vision of a ‘Europe of solidarity’ and made the 
fragmentation of the EU both thinkable and real. In the process of its disentanglement from the 
European Union, the United Kingdom seeks the retreat of solidarity within national borders and 
the uncoupling of the British society from ‘the society of the peoples of the Union’.6 This is an 
unprecedented development in the process of European unification; the latter has seen pauses 
but no retreats.7  
 
This is a new territory for theories of European integration as well. Premised on an assumed 
willingness on the part of the Member States to participate in transgovernmental or 
supranational arrangements, their theoretical repertoire has explained intergovernmental 
dissent, stagnation, spill backs, incrementalism, differentiated integration and so on. But 
                                                 
1
 Laeken European Council, 14-15 December 2001, Annexes to Presidency Conclusions, Annex 1, SV 300/1/01 REV1, at 19. 
 
2 Id at 20. 
 
3Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, December 13, 
2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1. 
  
4 Dora Kostakopoulou, “Liberalism and Societal Integration: In Defence of Reciprocity and Constructive Pluralism” (2014) 43 
Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 127. 
 
5 The Schuman Declaration, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe.../schuman-declaration_en. 
  
6 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro at para. 23, Case C-499/06, Halina Nerkowska v. Zaklad Ubezpieczen Spolecznych (February 
28, 2008), ECLI:EU:C:2008:132, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-499/06#. 
 
7 Article 50 TEU has not been activated before and thus there has been no precedent in the EU’s institutional memory. 
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adjustments are needed in order to account for the British ‘no to Europe’ and the muscular 
discourse on the repatriation of powers from the EU to the Member States in the present socio-
political and economic conjuncture. The UK is not the only Eurosceptic voice; governmental 
elites in the new Member States, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, and 
non-governmental political elites in the Netherlands and France find an opportunity to express 
their intergovernmental vision of the EU and to re-assert the national muscle.   
 
Looking at the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union through the lens of 
a historical discursive approach and revisiting an older question posed by Franck et al.,8 namely, 
why federations fail, are the aims of this article. The subsequent discussion highlights the role of 
political commitment to the success or the failure of a political Union and suggests a 
reconsideration of the situated agency in processes of political fission. This has implications for 
European Union and the position it will adopt in the withdrawal negotiations following the 
activation of Article 50 TEU as well as for regional integration theory and practice.     
 
The discussion is structured as follows. The first section embarks upon a brief exploration of old 
and new theories of European integration with reference to the Brexit developments. In the 
second section, I defend the merits of a historical discursive approach by examining the work of 
Franck et al. on failed federations and the roots of the British Eurosceptic opposition to Europe. I 
draw the implications of this for Britain, the European Union and integration theory, which 
needs to pay more attention to micro-variables and ideology, in sections 3, 4 and 5, respectively. 
The concluding remarks are contained in the last section of the article.   
 
 
 Where Old and New European Integration Theories Succeed and Fail 
 
European integration has been one of the most novel and complex political experiments in the 
world and, naturally, it has sparked an astonishingly rich and sophisticated research activity.9 To 
the three ‘classical’ theories of European integration and their various modulations, namely, 
intergovernmentalism/liberal intergovernmentalism,10 federalism,11 
functionalism/neofunctionalism,12 was added what may be called the ‘fourth force’ in European 
integration theorising. The latter refers to the coalescence of various perspectives and 
                                                 
8 T. M. Franck, G. H. Flanz, H. J. Spiro and F. N. Trager, Why Federations Fail: An Inquiry into the Requisites for Successful Federalism 
(New York: New York University Press, 1968). 
 
9 For an overview of the wide-ranging theoretical perspectives, see B. Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (Houndmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); M. Pollack, ''Theorising the European Union: International Organisation, Domestic Polity or Experiment 
in New Governance?'' (2005) 8 Annual Review of Political Science 357, 357-98; S. Saurugger, Theoretical Approaches to European 
Integration (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
 
10 See A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1998). 
 
11 M. Burgess and A.-G. Gagnon (eds.), Comparative Federalism and Federation: Competing Traditions and Future Directions (Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).  
  
12 D. Mitrany, “The Functional Approach to World Organisation” (1948) 24(3) International Affairs 350, 350-63). Neofunctionalism 
transcended the functionalist distinction between technical and political processes and pioneered the notion of the spill-over effect 
of integration; E. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-7 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1958). Both Haas and Schmitter enriched the model by developing the concepts of spill-back, spill-around and muddle-about; P. C. 
Schmitter, “Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses about European Integration” (1969) 23(1) International Organisation 161, 161-66. 
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approaches that developed mainly in the 1990s and coincided with the ‘political turn’ of the 
EU.13 These include: multilevel governance, comparative politics, policy-making approaches, 
policy networks and the regulatory paradigm, new institutionalism, constructivism and more 
recently actor-network and practice theories.14 The three classical approaches emerged and 
developed as a result of looking at European integration and the European Community/the 
European Union from the outside in. They were keen to depict distinct centres of power and 
hierarchical relations, and remained much more embedded into the nation-state’s vocabulary 
and assumptions. In contrast, the fourth force developed as a result of looking at European 
integration from the inside out. Accordingly, these approaches tend to view the EU on more 
heterarchical and acentric terms and have been more confident in terms of pulling back from 
statist perspectives.15 So whereas the ‘old’ theories are characterised by dichotomic thinking, 
such as intergovernmentalism v supranationalism and either/or dilemmas, such as, ‘more’ or 
‘less’ ‘Europe’ and the advantages or disadvantages of competence rebalancing exercises, the 
strands of the ‘fourth force’ paradigm tend to be less interested in dichotomies and more 
interested in studying the connectivity among the various layers of governance, synergies and 
forms of reflexive governance.  
 
The ‘crises’ that have dominated the European political landscape over the last few years, be 
they economic, migration and refugee-related, and the rise in Euro-scepticism and populism 
demonstrated that European integration does not evolve along a singular and linear dynamic. 
Nor does it evolve in a dialectic way; conflicts and their negation do not lead to a new synthesis. 
Change is ever unfolding and more often than not there is no alternative to changing 
institutional courses or changing rules in the middle of ‘the game’. Seeking to reduce these 
dynamics to a concrete and final template cannot but be an intentional act of simplification. 
Although it has recently become apparent that attention needs to be put on opportunities for 
reform, experimentation and institutional innovation, institutional change remains under-
researched.  
 
The Brexit referendum outcome brought about the reality of a break-up of the European Union 
and significant destabilisation. The ‘unthinkable’ has taken place. Using the existing theoretical 
lenses in order to account for such an unprecedented challenge might not be very helpful. In 
addition, the real possibility of its contagion among the other Member States shows that Brexit 
should not be relegated into a footnote to an overall positive blueprint. One needs to 
understand what Brexit is about and the ideological roots of the present British Government’s 
opposition to Europe. Intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism could 
accommodate this development within their state-centric paradigm, but even these theories are 
                                                 
13 Rosamond, supra note 9, has used the phrase “theorising the ‘New Europe’”; see chapter 5 at p. 98. 
 
14 J. Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg, Decision-Making in the European Union (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); R. Rhodes, “The New 
Governance: Governing without Government” (1996) 44(4) Political Studies 652, 652-67; T. Christiansen, K. E. Jorgensen, and A. 
Wiener, The Social Construction of Europe (London: Sage, 2001); J. Jupille, J. A. Caporaso, and J. T. Checkel, “Integrating Institutions: 
Rationalism, Constructivism and the Study of the European Union” (2003) 36(1) Comparative Political Studies 7, 7-40; G. Majone, 
“The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe” (1994) 17(3) West European Politics 77, 77-101; C. Bueger and J. Stockbruegger, “Actor-
Network theory: Objects, Actants, Networks and Narratives”, in Daniel R. McCarthy (eds.), Technology and World Politics: An 
Introduction (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016); R. Adler-Nissen and K. Kropp, “A Sociology of Knowledge Approach to European 
Integration: Four Analytical Principles” (2015) 37(2) Journal of European Integration 155, 155-173; R. Adler-Nissen, “Towards a 
Practice Turn in EU Studies: The Everyday of European Integration” (2015) 54(1) Journal of Common Market Studies 87, 87-103. 
 
15 Dora Kostakopoulou, “Towards a theory of Constructive citizenship in Europe’ (1996) 4(4) Journal of Political Philosophy 337, 337-
58 (1996); R. Howse and K. Nicolaidis, “Democracy without Sovereignty: The Global Vocation of Political Ethics”, in T. Broude and Y. 
Shany (eds) The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law (Oxford: Hart, 2008). 
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built on the assumption that Member States wish to co-operate and to reduce transaction costs 
within a broader political framework of conferred (or pooled) powers. Similarly, the new 
theories of European integration might find it difficult to account for the British ‘no to Europe’. 
They have highlighted the vectorial dimension of the EU governance, the Europeanisation of 
national legislation, that is, its adaptation to the European Union laws and policies16, the 
constructive effect of EU institutions, policies and norms on national polities17and on the 
socialisation of political actors,18 but the decisive effects of contingent events and happenings, 
such as Brexit, cannot be neatly mapped onto them. In this respect, a more historical 
perspective might offer valuable insights in understanding the recent centrifugalism and fission 
in the European Union.  
 
  
Accounting for fission: a historical discursive approach 
 
In the foregoing section, the discussion unravelled the merits of ‘old’ and ‘new’ theorising on 
European integration and set the scene for the development of an historical discursive approach 
which could help us to understand Brexit and the policy dilemmas it has generated. 
Interestingly, the ‘let’s take back control’ campaign in the United Kingdom exposes a battle of 
ideas, defects in leadership and short-term self-serving ambitions on the part of certain 
politicians which have already taken place in the past. These resulted in the abortion of 
cooperative political arrangements several decades ago which could have changed the course of 
world history, as follows.    
 
 
I. ‘Why Federations Fail’: the importance of a political commitment to the ideal of a Union 
 
Why do federations fail?  This was the title of a book published in 1968 by Thomas Franck et 
al..19 It was the product of research on the requisites for successful federalism conducted under 
the auspices of the Centre for International Studies at New York University. The authors were 
interested in identifying all those constitutional and non-constitutional factors which were 
responsible for four failed regional unification initiatives in the 1950s and the 1960s in the non-
Western world: namely, the West Indies, East Africa, Malaysia and Rhodesia-Nyasaland. By 
conducting such a ‘post-mortem’ inquiry, they wished to explain ‘why federations fail’ and, by so 
doing, to furnish suggestions for the normative preconditions for the success of political 
federalist experiments around the world.  
 
Franck researched the East African Federation, Herbert Spiro worked on the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, while Gisbert Flanz and Frank Trager examined the West Indies and 
                                                 
16 T. Börzel and T. Risse, “Conceptualising the Domestic Impact of Europe” in K. Featherstone and C. M. Radaelli (eds), The Politics of 
Europeanisation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).  
 
17 Id. More attention to the micro-level and the everyday experiences of European citizens has been paid by recent sociological 
literature: J. Diez Mendrano, ''The public sphere and the European Union's political identity” in J. T. Checkel and P. J. Katzenstein 
(eds.), European Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); A. Favell and V. Guiraudon, “The Sociology of the European 
Union: An Agenda'' (2009) 10(4) European Union Politics 550, 550-76. 
 
18 Christiansen et al., supra note 14. 
 
19 T. Franck et al., supra note 8.  
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the Federation of Malaysia, respectively. These four cases represented ‘four experiments in 
creative federalism at the end of the same imperial connection’20 and were seen to capture 
perfectly the tensions between centralist and decentralist forces as well as the battle between 
‘mercantilist federalists’ and ‘tribal nationalists’.  
 
In their comparative research, Franck et al. sought to examine the contribution of ‘institutional 
essentials’ as well as personal and psychological factors to the success or the failure of a 
federation. The former included a consideration of two sets of factors. Firstly, the role played by 
the constitution of a country and the extent to which it allowed a balance between powers that 
could be transferred and powers which could be reserved by the states. Secondly, the influence 
of non-constitutional factors such as, religion, culture, language and the distribution of 
recourses. The personal and psychological factors, on the other hand, included a focus on the 
personal qualities of the elites that were in power or mattered, such as, their charisma, 
commitment, friendships, rivalries, and personal ambitions. Such a dual focus, that is, both 
macro- and micro-political, enabled a comprehensive examination of both structural and 
agency-related variables and the role of ‘time’ or to be more precise of ‘bad timing’ and 
economic opportunism. And although in the introduction to the book Frank Trager argued that 
‘in the final analysis we cannot know – in the scientific sense- all the “essential” elements which 
hold the “cement” of a system together or cause it to fissure and break’,21 all agreed that the 
federalist experiments they examined failed because ‘no one who mattered was sufficiently 
committed to their success’.22  
 
The singling out among the factors responsible for failure of ‘the absence of a positive 
commitment to the ideal of partnership’23 and even an ideological rejection of the federal ideal 
is very important. Indeed, in the context of the West Indies, Flanz argued that ‘the basic 
problems of the federation were caused by geographical and historical factors, which were 
aggravated by deep-rooted attitudes of insularism and petty nationalism. These divisive forces 
were reinforced by economic factors’.24 Jamaica withdrew from the West Indian Federation 
following a referendum which took place on 19 September 1961 and saw 55 per cent of the 
participants voting against remaining in the federation. The referendum was called following the 
enactment of the Federal Referendum Bill by the Federal House of Representatives. The latter 
was later seen as a serious political misjudgement by the Prime Minister, Mr Manley, who had 
campaigned in favour of Jamaica’s continued membership, but was rather quick to accept the 
‘mandate of the people’ following the referendum.25 He had faced stiff opposition by the leader 
of the Jamaican Labour Party, Sir Alexander Bustamante, whose anti-federation campaign 
exploited the domestic economic concerns of the Jamaican people and their dissatisfaction with 
the government. One cannot but be surprised by the similarities with the Brexit referendum and 
its aftermath. Indeed, Franz includes data on Sir Alexander Bustamante’s anti-federation 
                                                 
20 Id. at ix. 
 
21 Id. at xv. 
 
22 Id. at p. 83. 
 
23 Id. at p. 83. 
 
24 Id. at p. 104. 
 
25 Id. at pp. 102 and 114. 
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campaign: ‘during the referendum campaign they insisted that an independent Jamaica would 
cost its taxpayers £ 200,000 ($560,000) less than Jamaica in the Federation’.26 The idea of a 
costly membership which would probably require increased levels of domestic taxation did not 
attract votes.27 Notwithstanding this, the result of the referendum was quite close.   
 
In the four federalist initiatives, the ruling elites’ commitment to the ‘common good’ of public 
Unions28 and belief in the value of political and economic integration were missing. Instead, 
nationalist ideology coupled with personal political ambition dictated the political choices of 
governments. Franck concluded: ‘the absence of a positive political or ideological commitment 
to the primary goal of federation as an end in itself among the leaders and people of each of the 
federating units did in all four instances, make success improbable, if not impossible. This was 
the one consistent factor found in the four federal failures.’29 And he continued: ‘the principal 
cause for failure, or partial failure, of each of the federations studied cannot, it thus seems, be 
found in an analysis of economic statistics or in an inventory of social, cultural, or institutional 
diversity. It can only be found in the absence of a sufficient political-ideological commitment to 
the primary concept or value of federation itself.’30       
 
The absence of a clear political and ideological commitment to the European Union has been an 
enduring feature of the British Conservative Party’s Eurosceptic wing. Nationalism coupled with 
the belief that the ‘dominocracy’ of domestic executives should not be challenged or 
compromised by political and judicial decision-making above, or beyond, the nation-state have 
characterised its opposition to the European unification project for decades. In the past, these 
‘winds of doctrine’31 blew at the fringes of the British political landscape. The demise of the 
Labour Party’s hold on political power opened the way for their impact on the intellectual 
temper of the British political scene.  
 
The economic crisis and austerity policies coupled with an increased opposition to migration 
from the new Eastern European Member States facilitated the reception of such ideas by the 
larger population. In what follows, I wish to shed light onto the roots of the ‘Let’s take back 
control’ opposition to Europe. The ideational anchoring of British Euroscepticism shows the 
persisting absence of a political commitment to the vision of an integrated Europe. Political 
elites’ national-state centrism was not premised on a desire for improved ‘two level games’,32 
that is, the reform of the multiple and complex games between the EU and the Member States, 
                                                 
26 Id. at p. 101. 
 
27 Similarly, the British Vote Leave campaign included the misleading claim that leaving the EU would result in a £ 350m weekly 
windfall for Britain. This claim gave rise to criticism by the UK Statistics Authority. Its head, Sir Andrew Dilnot, noted that such claims 
undermine trust in official statistics; cited by Nigel Morris, ‘Rival campaigns criticised for misleading public on Brexit’, METRO, 
Saturday 28 May 2016, at 8. 
  
28 P. Reinsch, “International Administrative Law and National Sovereignty” (1909) 3 American Journal of International Law 1. For an 
excellent account on the emergence of functionalism in international relations, see J. Klabbers, “The Emergence of Functionalism in 
International Institutional Law: Colonial Inspirations” (2014) 25(3) The European Journal of International Law 645, 645-675. 
 
29 Franck et al., supra note 8 at p. 173. 
 
30 Id. at p. 177. 
  
31 This term is borrowed from G. Santayana, Winds of Doctrine: Studies in Contemporary Opinion (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1913). 
 
32 F. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).  
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but on a reluctance ‘to keep the ball rolling’, that is, a desire to question ordered and agreed 
relationships. The implications of this discussion for the United Kingdom and the European 
Union are explored in sections 3 and 4.  
    
II. Brexit: the roots of dissent  
 
Mr Boris Johnson, a protagonist of the ‘Vote Leave the EU’ campaign in the United Kingdom, 
delivered a personal message to the readers of a newspaper on the eve of the referendum. He 
wrote: ‘tomorrow the people of this great country face an once-in-a-lifetime choice: ever closer 
political union inside a failing and anti-democratic EU, or freedom’….. The EU is undemocratic, 
bureaucratic and unrepentant for its failings. Tomorrow you have an once-in-a-lifetime 
opportunity to take back control. To lift our eyes beyond the strangulation of the EU, to co-
operate and trade not just across the European continent but with the rest of the world.’33 The 
view that EU is an undemocratic and bureaucratic organisation was not an invention of the 
‘Vote Leave’ campaign in 2016. Such a line of reasoning has been disseminated in the public 
arena by the Right in the UK since the early 1990s. It has been underpinned by the belief that 
the national framework is the best institutional framework for democracy to work. And since 
national democracies derive their legitimacy from the ‘unified will of the people’, ‘Europe’ 
cannot be a democracy. It lacks a unified demos and a homogenising identity.34 As Wallace 
noted in 1995, ‘the Conservative Party’s discourse is instinctively that of national identity’.35  
 
As the 1991 Intergovernmental Conference was negotiating the Treaty on European Union (in 
force on 1 November 1993), Conservative Eurosceptics felt compelled to defend British national 
sovereignty against a possible federal scenario. They argued that the morphing of the European 
Community into a European Union was based on the false assumption that the nation-state had 
no future in Europe. They believed that the both the state, as a primary organisational concept, 
and British sovereignty were at risk and thus had to be defended. These beliefs were mandated 
by a particular way of viewing developments in Europe.     
 
In fact, Baroness Thatcher’s successor, Sir John Major, did not preside over a united 
Conservative party.36 The entry into force of the Treaty on European Union (- the so-called 
Maastricht Treaty) was fuelling anxieties about the future of statehood in an integrated Europe. 
In late 1994, nine Conservative backbenchers defied Sir Major’s policy on fishing rights in the 
House of Commons and eight of them were deprived of the party whip in January 1995. 
Refusing to accept this predicament, the Euro-rebels produced an eight point policy paper which 
called for the renegotiation of Britain’s relationship with the European Union. In interviews and 
the media, they argued that further European integration threatened the ‘survival’ of the United 
                                                 
 
33 Published in METRO, Wednesday 22 June 2016 at p. 5. 
 
34 Dora Kostakopoulou, Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the European Union: Between Past and Future (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2001) at p. 9. This debate was anchored on the ‘no-demos’ thesis expressed by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court in Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2159/92, Brunner v European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57. For an excellent 
critique, see J. H. H. Weiler, “Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision” 
(1995) 1(3) EUROPEAN L.J. 219, 219-58; U. Preuss, “Problems of a Concept of European Citizenship” (1995) 1(1) EUROPEAN L.J. 267, 
267-81. 
 
35 Helen Wallace, “Britain Out on a Limb?” (1995) 66 Political Quarterly 47, 47-58 at p. 50. 
 
36 The discussion here draws on a Lecture I delivered at Durham University in February 2015. 
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Kingdom and that a different relationship with the EU based on free trade and friendship was 
needed.  
 
Their ideology was distinctly nationalist and intergovernmentalist. The limitations imposed on 
‘national sovereignty’ by the EU were perceived to result in the weakening of the national 
community of belonging and identity. The whipless Euro-rebels thus articulated a manifesto 
which demanded a reduced role for Britain in Europe. In the four page document they 
produced, they demanded the end of the Common Agricultural and Fisheries policies, the end to 
the Court of Justice’s activism, a right to ban the export of live animals, an issue that was topical 
at that time, the UK’s opt out from the European Monetary Union and the Common Foreign and 
Security policies and the abolition of the directly elected European Parliament. In its place, they 
suggested an assembly consisting of members of national parliaments nominated by the 
Member States. They also demanded the curtailment of the EU budget.  
 
Although Sir Teddy Taylor, the most senior of the rebels, was insisting that their manifesto was 
not a direct challenge to the Government’s policy on Europe, in reality their discourse was 
procuring a schism in the Conservative Party.37 Their ‘mission statement’ to ‘defend a sense of 
country’ and their calls for the repatriation of decision-making from ‘unaccountable and 
undemocratic foreign institutions’ were influencing moderate Conservatives and public opinion. 
In its Editorial, The Guardian criticised those statements: ‘These policies are not Euroscepticism. 
They are Europhobia. They are anti-Europe in every way. They remove any meaning or 
substance from membership of the European Union.’ And it continued: ‘An old-fashioned anti-
European agenda like this ought not to be serious politics in the 1990s.’…‘The Europhobes have 
succeeded and are succeeding in dragging the Prime Minister, his party and thus the country 
even further off base’.38  
 
The Prime Minister could not ignore the Euro-rebels’ discourse. Preparations for the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference, which culminated in the Treaty of Amsterdam (in force on 1 
May 1999), had commenced and, in an attempt to appease the Euro-rebels and to foreclose the 
possibility of a referendum on EU membership, he declared publicly that the UK would not join 
the single currency and that he would not agree to any further extension of qualified majority 
voting in the Council of Ministers. His Defence Secretary, Sir Malcolm Rifkind, delivered a speech 
in Brussels emphasising that the Union is a Union of nation-states, while Sir Major was stating 
internally that there was no need for a referendum because he would not accept any 
‘constitutional changes’ during the negotiations for the amendment of the Treaties. Pro-
European members of the Cabinet were marginalised and Lord Douglas Hurd, who had 
produced a paper on the 1996 IGC and had criticised the Euro-rebels’ manifesto, was eventually 
forced to retire from the Cabinet in the summer (summer 1995). All this did not prevent Sir 
James Goldsmith to launch a new party, the Referendum Party. The Party had a single aim, 
namely, the enactment of a Referendum Bill. Sir Goldsmith stated that as soon as the Bill was 
enacted, the members would resign their seat and the party would dissolve itself. 
 
The Euro-rebels and Sir James Goldsmith continued to call for an EU membership referendum in 
subsequent years. The same pressures that John Major encountered in 1995, Mr Cameron 
                                                 
37 Hugo Young, ‘Grey clouds lift to reveal Major’s bleak Euro-vision’, The Guardian, 19 January 1995. 
 
38 The Guardian, Editorial, 20 January 1995. 
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encountered a decade later. Unable to appease his Euro-sceptic backbenchers, Mr Cameron 
entertained the idea of an EU membership referendum in 2010. In January 2013, he pledged 
referendum on the UK’s continued membership of the EU if the Conservatives won the 2015 
election. He subsequently sought a ‘New Deal for the UK’, which resembled the Euro-rebels’ 
1995 manifesto. The only major difference was the replacement of the dissatisfaction with the 
Common Agricultural Policies with the EU free movement regime.  
 
In his letter to the President of the European Council (10 November 2015), Mr Donald Tusk, Mr 
Cameron, outlined the British demands for a renegotiated EU membership.39 Free movement 
rules and the Court’s judicial activism remained key concerns for the Government, in addition to 
affirming the UK’s opt-out form the Eurozone and enhancing competitiveness. The UK also 
sought the amendment of the Treaty’s reference to ‘an ever closer Union’, an enhanced role for 
national parliaments which would involve a collective national parliamentary veto of EU 
legislative proposals, less ‘Europe’ in line with the principle of subsidiarity and the continuation 
of the UK’s opt-outs from justice and home affair issues. Concerning the free movement of EU 
citizens (- it is noteworthy that the title used was not ‘internal mobility’, but ‘immigration’), Mr 
Cameron requested extended transitional arrangements for future participating countries, 
tackling the alleged abuse of free movement provisions and taming the activism of the Court of 
Justice in this policy area. The most controversial proposal was the postponement of the 
application of the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality as regards the EU 
citizens’ entitlement to in-work benefits and social housing. In this respect, Mr Cameron 
suggested a four year residency criterion and envisaged that all these proposals would form the 
content of an agreement which would eventually morph into a legal binding protocol which 
would be attached to the Treaties.    
 
Although Mr Cameron wished for the UK to remain within the European Union, his commitment 
to the European Union project was not wholehearted. He had already succumbed to the 
pressure exerted by the Eurosceptic wing of his party and had pledged a referendum in 2010. 
Self-serving political ambition triumphed over political conviction and a commitment to ‘the 
good’ for the whole of Europe. In 2015, the same pressure led him to question fundamental, 
overarching principles of the European Union legal and political framework which had been 
settled since the late 1950s and the early 1960s, such as the role and powers of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union and the fundamental freedom of free movement and residence, 
one of the four pillars of the single market. Instead of leading both his party and the country, he 
allowed nationalist centrifugalism to dictate a new generative perspective which, unavoidably, 
weakened the ‘case for Europe’40 in the UK.  
 
 
Britain’s Special Folkdance 
 
Both the Eurorebels’ manifesto in 1995 and Mr Cameron’s proposals more than a decade later 
reflected the desire for the emasculation of state elites and the ‘restoration’ of British 
                                                 
39 The British Prime Minister’s letter to the President of the European Council, Mr Donald Tusk, 10 November 2015; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/eu-reform-pms-letter-to-president-of-the-european-council-donald-tusk, accessed 
on 18/03/2016.  
 
40 This is borrowed from Philippe de Schoutheete, The Case for Europe; Unity, Diversity, and Democracy in the European Union 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000).  
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sovereignty by loosening the ties with the European Union. This, in effect, implied the 
questioning of the European Union acquis, the dissolution of legal and political obligations 
undertaken voluntarily several decades ago and the restoration of unanimity in European Union 
decision-making. In such a discourse there is little appreciation for the institutional layering and 
the legal and procedural interweaving that have taken place during the European integration 
process. One discerns quite clearly the worshipping of a rather illusionary notion of state 
sovereignty.41  
 
True, the temper of the age has facilitated the dissemination of such arguments. The austere 
economic climate and the ensuing sense of uncertainty leave room for ideological scripts, 
patriot games and a generalised belief that ‘confrontation politics’ yields results. In addition, 
while austerity programmes take hold in several European countries and the debate about how 
to make undisciplined public expenditures more controllable and sustainable continues in a 
lively way, we notice the rising of intolerance towards Europe’s ethnic residents and citizens, 
neo-nationalism, populism and Euro-scepticism. This is not something new. Conservative forces 
have always exploited economic circumstances in order to capture the political imagination and 
to provide simplistic narratives with a view to attracting votes.  
 
The European Union’s free movement rules are depicted as the problem despite the fact that 
declining living standards, youth unemployment and shrinking welfare budgets are the product 
of domestic economic policy choices as well. Anti-Europeanism is vocalized through a patriotic-
nationalist discourse which extols ‘national sovereignty’, ‘repatriation of powers from Brussels’ 
and migration control. Elites find it easier to convince people that national institutions are the 
best promoters of individual welfare and advancement and the best managers of socio-political 
contexts. It does not matter if socio-political and economic realities in a globalised era 
demonstrate that no single institutional actor can accomplish things and find solutions without 
the manifold input of other institutional actors.  
 
In the 21st century all polities in the Western World are more or less compound republics and 
this compounding is unlikely to be reversed partly because issues, challenges and problems are 
transnational in character or in their effects. Compounding also increases respect for the rule of 
law precisely because ‘the governed’ cannot evade the partial control of institutions above 
them. It thus reduces ‘dominocracy’, that is, the power of elected majorities and leaves a more 
circumscribed space for governments ‘behaving badly’. For this reason, the European Union-
based compounding has to be dismantled. Brexit means Brexit, after all.42 
 
Leaving the European ‘pactum unionis’, to use a Hobbesian term,43 would mean a return to a 
world in which democracy and accountability become again equated with national sovereignty, 
closure and non-intervention. And this not only forecloses the possibility of further 
                                                 
41 See H. J. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917); N. G. Onuf, “Sovereignty: Outline of 
a Conceptual History” (1991) 16 Alternatives 425; N. MacCormick, “Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-Sovereign State” (1996) 
44(3) Political Studies 553; “Beyond the Sovereign State” (1993) 56(1) Modern Law Review 1; Dora Kostakopoulou, “Floating 
Sovereignty: A Pathology or a Necessary Means of State Evolution?” (2002) 22(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 135; Neil Walker, 
Intimations of Global Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).     
 
42 The British Prime Minister, Mrs May, has repeatedly stated this. 
 
43 T. Hobbes, LEVIATHAN (1651). 
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democratisation in practices and institutions but also reduces the possibilities for citizens to 
hold their leaders to account by utilising norms and rules higher up. Breaking the ‘pactum 
unionis’ would thus strengthen the authority of the nation-state and the ‘national-statist 
pactum subjectionis’ as far as citizens and residents are concerned. Affirming the primacy of 
everything national thus benefits most national executives who would be able to shield their 
rule from the checks and balances that characterise complex societies and unions of states and 
peoples.44    
 
If we reflect further on the serviceability of the discourse surrounding the EU membership 
referendum and the political options in view, we could identify more concrete harms on 
individuals and the society, in general. For both the discourse and the specific issue of EU 
migration, which featured at the heart of the UK’s renegotiation package,45 have impacted 
directly on individuals, irrespective of their nationality and residence. They disrupted the bonds 
of social fellowship generated by working together in society46 and have created ‘othering’. Such 
artificial divisions are exploited by the right wing press in order to arouse irrational fears and 
prejudice among the population. Boundary lines are drawn and redrawn: workers are 
distinguished from work-seekers; workers are divided on the basis of their nationality; newly 
arrived ‘EU migrant workers’ are distinguished from permanent EU residents and so on. Anti-EU 
migrant agitation is driven by the irrational fear of propelled stereotypes.   
 
Othering is essentially about distancing: keeping ourselves apart from those who we wish to 
depict as Others. And distancing could be physical, that is, manifested in strict border controls 
and/or the building of walls separating the ‘ins’ from ‘outs’, or spatial. In the latter case, the 
space is fractured and boundary lines are drawn. It could also be social and psychological. The 
latter happens when the Other shares the same space but (s)he is made to feel that (s)he does 
not belong to it. The Other’s empirical presence is thus denied in law and (s)he is kept apart by 
policies which pose obstacles to his/her full inclusion.  
 
By seeking to narrow the social bonds and ties, however, the openness of the British society and 
its cosmopolitan outlook are compromised. Individuals are no longer interested in taking part in 
the wider community of ‘human argument and aspirations’.47 Instead, they focus on 
safeguarding state resources from ‘welfare tourists’. The public discourse becomes defensive. 
Although the UK’s has failed to provide empirical evidence to substantiate the ‘benefit tourism’ 
claim despite the Commission’s request, images of EU citizens as welfare seekers are created 
and manipulated so that the future itself can be manipulated. The Government constructs the 
narrative, fails to substantiate it empirically and then responds to it by seeking changes in the 
EU free movement regulations. There are no such things as simple facts; the political discourse 
involves constructs.  
                                                 
44 K. Nicolaidis, “This is my EUtopia…: Narrative as Power” (2002) 40(2) Journal of Common Market Studies 767, 767-92; Dora 
Kostakopoulou, “Conclusion: Towards a Humanistic Philosophy of the European Union” in N. Ferreira and D. Kostakopoulou (eds.), 
The Human Face of the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
 
45 It also featured in the Prime Minister’s letter to the President of the European Council, Mr Donald Tusk, 10 November 2015, supra 
note 39. 
 
46 G. Simmel, “How is Society Possible?” (1910) 13(3) American Journal of Sociology 372, 372-391. 
 
47 It is cited in D. Held, “Principles of Cosmopolitan Order” in G. Brock and H. Brighouse (eds.), The Political Philosophy of 
Cosmopolitanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 10. 
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Such constructs can alter common-sense realities and affect societal relations. The society 
becomes unsettled and quietly altered as the narrative unfolds; it becomes more inward 
looking, restricted and less humane. The ability to share, to work together, to cooperate, to 
celebrate human creativity and innovation is impaired. The socio-political environment becomes 
narrow, constraining and immoral since human beings are stereotyped, pronounced to be 
burdens and problems and are seen with suspicion and contempt. Amidst the reality of negative 
perceptions and ill-feelings about EU citizens, morality becomes synonymous to ‘stateways’ and 
‘folkways’.48 Otherwise put, it is framed as the morality of insiders, the members of the in-
group, and not of an expanding circle of co-residents and co-citizens sharing the benefits and 
burdens of the commonwealth they construct with their multifarious activities.  
 
For this reason, EU citizens became EU migrants in official discourses during the months 
preceding, and following, the referendum. As a consequence, EU citizens residing permanently 
in the United Kingdom find themselves caught in multiple realities.49 Embedded within the webs 
of their everyday lives and their socio-political relations, they suddenly realise that the 
environment redefines their status and role within society by depicting them as guests or as 
outsiders. The relevant substratum underpinning their status, that is, the rights derived from the 
EU free movement rules and EU citizenship, is becoming irrelevant in British politics thereby 
changing their biographical situation. Both their identity and ‘being here’ can no longer be taken 
for granted since the post-referendum, nationalist ‘we’ might exclude them. A new system of 
relevancies is emerging anchored on British nationality or ‘in-group’ status. Nationalist 
centrifugalism thus creates internal divisions and exclusions.      
  
 
Implications for the European Union: political dismantling and vaccination  
 
The discussion on the federalist experiments of the 1950s and 1960s revealed that federations 
fail owing to the absence of a clear political ideological commitment to the success of the 
federation. The historical discursive examination of the Conservative Party’s Eurosceptic 
ideology confirmed it. State-centrism and nationalist ideology coupled with personal political 
ambition and defective leadership on the part of political protagonists are the crucial factors 
underpinning Brexit. But what are the implications of this for the European Union project? And 
how should Europe’s leaders face the forthcoming withdrawal negotiations with Britain 
following the activation of Article 50 TEU? 
 
The European Union is clearly troubled by the developments in the United Kingdom. It is 
characteristic of human nature to accommodate unexpected negative change by looking inward. 
By the latter, I refer to the tendency to look for shortcomings which could explain the Brexit 
decision in the process of European integration itself and the operation of the EU. For instance, 
it has been argued that since nearly 52% of the British referendum voters are dissatisfied with 
the EU, clearly there must be something wrong with it, or with its functioning. Or that the free 
movement rules have to be rethought in an age of austerity. Although such arguments are 
understandable, the foregoing discussion counsels caution towards accepting them.    
                                                 
48 W. G. Sumner, Folkways: A study of Mores, Manners, Customs and Morals (Boston: Ginn and Co, 1906). 
 
49 Alfred Schutz used this term in 1945. See his article entitled “On Multiple Realities” (1945) V Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 533, 533-576.   
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The European project has not suffered a fundamental defeat just because the political elites that 
mattered in the UK were not sufficiently committed to it. Nor does Europe need to change in 
order to accommodate the contemporary manifestations of nationalistic centrifugalism which 
the European project has been designed to transcend. The European Union needs to avoid its 
capture by the British Conservative Eurosceptics. By standing firm, affirming the values 
animating the European Union (Article 2 TEU) and the added value of its four fundamental 
freedoms, it will not compromise its operation, the ethos of internationalism, the connectivity 
among peoples and individuals it has fostered and the respect for fundamental rights and non-
discrimination. The Bratislava Declaration, adopted by the 27 Member States on 16 September 
2016, echoes this by stating that ‘although one country has decided to leave, the EU remains 
indispensable for the rest of us’.50 
 
Mrs May’s Government finds inspiration, and guidance, in the world of the past. The ethos of 
partnership, political pragmatism, cosmopolitanism and the traditional openness of the British 
society have been left behind. In the future, the differences between the British self-interested 
and self-serving political choices, on the one hand, and the pursuit of a European common good 
through core principles, institutions, laws and policies, on the other, will be made visible. 
Policies based on misdiagnoses and on false and simplistic assumptions should not be allowed to 
define the European Union’s future because years later we might realise that the future was 
inadequately described and imagined and thus the policies adopted were ill thought and 
ineffective.  
 
Distancing, and insulating, the European Union project, from the British Eurosceptic cognitive 
map and policy menu might be wise. For any attempt to seek some kind of policy convergence 
or ideological conformity with the Eurosceptic demands on the part of the European Union 
institutions would undermine the ‘case for Europe’. An increased and resolute commitment to 
the European Union project is the only vaccine against nationalistic centrifugalism.  
 
In addition to increased levels of political commitment, pragmatism should prevail in the post-
Brexit era. The European Union needs to continue its operation without either being consumed 
by Brexit or exaggerating its impact. The absence of a political commitment to the EU in the UK 
is not a prelude to the disintegration of the European project. Nor does it show that a new vision 
or a new purpose is needed for the European Union. The UK’s disentanglement must be pursued 
in constructive exit negotiations in accordance with the requirements of Article 50 TEU.  
 
Brexit marks a definite turning point for the United Kingdom; constitutional, political, judicial 
and economic change will not be simply iterative there. It will be fundamental. Shielding the EU 
from those dynamics is essential in the interim period. United not only by the purpose, values, 
objectives and policies of the European integration process but also by what they refuse to 
destroy, European leaders and institutions need to rise above disruptive challenges and to resist 
the winds of nationalistic dogma and populism. An increased commitment to the case for a 
united Europe governed by its treaties and its values is the only vaccine against the agendas of 
national political elites wishing to exercise political power unimpaired and to act without 
accountability or embarrassment in the 21st century. 
                                                 
50 It was adopted by the European Union Council in Bratislava. The President of the European Council, the Presidency of the Council 
of the EU and the Commission also proposed the Bratislava Roadmap, that is, a work programme designed to make ‘a success of the 
EU’; https://www.consilium.europe.eu/.../2016/09/pdf/160916-bratislava... 
14 
 
 
Implications for integration theory 
 
The historical discursive approach surrounding the failed federalist initiatives in the past and the 
roots of Brexit placed an increased emphasis on agency-related factors, discourse and their 
entanglement with broader temporal and spatial dynamics. Time and space are crucial 
contextual components of any account of how, why and under what conditions political 
integration dynamics and outcomes change. Situated in time and space, the principal actors’ 
perceptions, beliefs, political and ideological commitments are important in explaining both 
fission and fusion in regional integration projects.  
 
Strands of institutionalism and constructivism could accommodate this.51 Ideas and norms are 
key aspects of institutional analysis in so far as they influence how and what people decide and 
thus the overall process of institutional development and change.52 Although both social 
constructivism and sociological institutionalism53 view institutions as independent variables 
containing ideas, norms and values that shape actors’ identities and preferences, more 
emphasis on actor-based non-linear change is needed. The power to create new inter-
subjectively shared meanings via discursive practices which are repeated over time should not 
be underestimated (i.e., the EU is allegedly undemocratic),54 for these, under certain conditions, 
can lead to aperiodic change.55  
 
Placing greater salience to agents’ capacity to undo stable systems, create new narratives and to 
construct new realities helps to overcome the structuralist bias inherent in the institutionalist 
literature56 as attested by its preference for ‘stable reproductive processes and patterns of 
behaviour’57 and for the privileging of structure over agency.58 Certainly, ‘path-dependent’ 
                                                 
51 It is premised on the idea that social practices, patterns of behaviour and the organisations that people create in order to regulate 
such patterns are shaped by formal and informal rules, practices, legal arrangements, conventions, regularised ideas, norms and 
routines. Institutions are thus key explanatory variables in accounting for social interaction – notwithstanding the existence of 
considerable divergence as to how they do this and how, why and under what conditions they change. 
 
52 M. Finnemore, “Norms, Culture and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism” (1996) 50(2) International 
Organisation 325, 325-47; J. Goldstein, Ideas, Interests and American Trade Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); J. 
Goldstein and R. O. Keohane (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1993); P. Hall, The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1989); M. Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002); P. M. Hirsch, “Sociology Without Social Structure: Neoinstitutional Theory Meets Brave New World” (1997) 
102(6) American Journal of Sociology 1702, 1702-23.  
 
53 Compare here A. L. Stinchcombe, “On the Virtues of the Old Institutionalism” (1977) 23 Annual Review of Sociology 1, 1-18. 
  
54 North concedes that he does not provide a full account of the role of ideas in the process of institutional change, but he, 
nevertheless, acknowledges their importance; D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) at pp. 85-6. Constructivist perspectives remedy this. See J. G. Ruggie, “What Makes the World 
Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge” (1998) 52(4) International Organisation 855); E. Adler, 
“Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics” (1997) 3(3) European Journal of International Relations 319, 319-63.  
 
55 Dora Kostakopoulou, “Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship: Explaining Institutional Change” (2005) 68(2) THE MODERN L. REV. 
233, 233-67.  
 
56 Institutionalism has been seen to be more successful in accounting for institutional stability than for institutional change; Jeffrey 
Stacey and Berthold Rittberger, “Dynamics of Formal and Institutional Change in the EU” (2003) 10(6) Journal of European Public 
Policy 858, 858-83, at p.  859. 
  
57 North, supra note 54; P. Pierson, “The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change” (2000) 4(13) Governance 474, 
474-99.  
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dynamics of institutional change have been supplemented with ‘path-shaping’ ones in the 
dynamic variant of historical institutionalism articulated by Hay59 and in Schmidt’s discoursive 
institutionalism.60 But in addition to the role played by ‘crises’ or ‘ruptures’ and their capacity to 
trigger evolutionary institutional dynamics and paradigmatic shifts,61 we saw the importance of 
the cumulative evolution of the British Eurosceptic discourse, the continuous political pressure 
actors exerted since the 1990s, misjudgements, defective leadership and the presence of 
politicians, such as Mr Farage, Mr Gove and Mr Johnson, the leaders of the Brexit campaign, 
who make views appealing and legitimate. In other words, in seeking to understand what 
fractures political Unions close attention should be given to agency.   
 
In all this, timing is crucial. Strong path-dependencies can explain Mr Cameron’s proposals as 
well as the ‘sovereignty’ maintenance preference of Eurosceptic MPs in the UK. But they cannot 
explain the popular appeal of this agenda among citizens disadvantaged by austerity and by 
other regional economic dislocations. Nor can they explain the circulation and reception of ‘no 
to Europe’ ideas which had not been embedded within the formal institutional setting and did 
not resonate with long-standing institutional frames and policies for almost fifteen years.62 
Hence unanticipated developments, such as the Brexit vote in June 2016, which require 
adjusted theoretical frames. Space and time thus intersect and impact on the (re-)production of 
discourses and their reception by the population. Pre-existing knowledge, personal ambitions, 
political commitments and ideology all play a role in the formation of actors’ perceptions of the 
surrounding environment, their belief systems and choice of actions. Maintaining the 
relationality and the interlocking of situated agency, discourse and space-time is an important 
finding of the foregoing discussion on what fractures political unions.  
  
 
Conclusion 
 
Reflecting on the European Union in 1996, I wrote that ‘it is a good example of a community of 
“concern and engagement”, for what unites the various units together in the European venture 
is neither some shared conception of Europe’s destiny nor a cohesive identity in a 
communitarian sense. Rather, what binds them in a Union is their commitment to the future of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
58 It is generally acknowledged that institutionalism privileges structure over agency. Hay’s ideational institutionalism sought to 
overcome this by paying attention to changes in paradigms arising in moments of perceived crisis. Policy change emerges as a 
‘punctuated evolution’; C. Hay, “The Crisis of Keynesianism and the Rise of Neoliberalism in Britain: An Ideational Institutionalist 
Approach” in J. L. Campbell and O. K. Pedersen (eds), The Second Moment in Institutional Analysis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2001). For a comprehensive account of institutional theories, see A. Heritier, Explaining Institutional Change 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
 
59 C. Hay, “Constructivist Institutionalism” in R.A.W. Rhodes et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), pp.  56-74.  
 
60 V. Schmidt, “Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change Through Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth New 
Institutionalism” (2010) 2 European Political Science Review 1, 1-25; “Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and 
Discourse” (2008) 11(1) Annual Review of Political Science 303, 303-26.  
 
61 Hay, supra note 59. 
 
62 My argument differs here from the premises of discoursive institutionalism which examines ideational variables in the context of 
institutional and/or interest-based variables; V. A. Schmidt and C. M. Radaelli, “Policy Change and Discourse in Europe: Conceptual 
and Methodological Issues” (2004) 27(2) West European Politics 183, 183-210, at p. 184 et seq..  
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the Union, in the sense of working together towards creating “an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe” while preserving and respecting the distinctive identities of its members. In 
this process there is neither consensus nor indeed certainty about the juridico-political shape of 
the outcome. There is only an active concern and willingness on behalf of its units to participate 
in the collective shaping of this process by designing appropriate institutions’.63 If such a political 
commitment is absent, the Union is susceptible to fragmentation and fission.  
 
Brexit signals the absence of a political commitment on the part of the ruling Conservative elite 
in the UK. The only vaccine to the risks posed by it for the European Union itself is an increased 
resolve on the part of the twenty seven Member States to transcend the winds of neo-
nationalism and populism and to demonstrate confidently to national elites, Europe’s citizens 
and residents and to the rest of the world that the European Union’s normative and systemic 
architecture is strong enough to accommodate flight.  
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 Kostakopoulou, supra note 34 at p. 103. 
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